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User Perception
Differences Concerning
Corporate Disclosure
by Larry B. Godwin

The concept of differential disclosure
has been actively debated during the
past several years. Differential dis
closure is the reporting of different
financial information to different users,
on the theory that information has
different degrees of utility for different
user groups.1 The more detailed and
technical disclosures are deemed ap
propriate for the professional investor,
while the less technical, more
“understandable” disclosures are view
ed as appropriate for nonprofessionals.
The concept of differential disclosure
is currently operational with respect to
periodic filings. The 10-K and 10-Q
reports, required of companies
registered with the Securities and Ex
change Commission, are geared to the
professional; annual and quarterly
reports to stockholders are intended to
serve the nonprofessional.
The Financial Analysts Federation
recently released a report urging cor
porate managements to exert more ef
fort in the area of differential disclosure.
The aim of such a disclosure policy was
seen as the determination of the op
timum body of information for a com
pany to reveal, without overburdening
the analysts or shareholders with too
much data.2
In January, 1976, when he was Chief
Accountant of the SEC, John Burton
said that one of the “major thrusts” of
the Commission in coming months
would be differential disclosure. He
challenged management to analytically
select the “most important” disclosures
and make them available to the “average
investors,” while at the same time mak

ing available to analysts the “kind of
data they need to reach professional
judgments about a company.3
At the same time, former SEC Chair
man Roderick Hills announced the for
mation of a new Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure to reassess all
SEC disclosure policies and the Com
mission’s methods of implementing
them.4 In November, 1977, the Com
mittee issued its final report to the SEC
and surprised some by advocating the
abandonment of the Commission’s
existing differential disclosure policy. It
suggested that public companies file
with the SEC their annual and quarterly
reports to shareholders in lieu of the
currently required 10-K and 10-Q
reports.5 In early 1978, the SEC ex
pressed agreement with the committee’s
suggestion, and said it would attempt
later in the year to develop a single, com
prehensive disclosure regulation com
bining the annual report to stock
holders and the 10-K report.6
Theoretically the concept of differen
tial disclosure has great merit. The most
compelling argument in favor of the
concept is that the “average investor”
has financial information needs that
may well differ from those of the pro
fessional analyst. Via differential dis
closure, the needs of each class of users
could be met without sacrificing the
needs of other groups.7 In addition, no
class of users would be subjected to in
formation overload if accounting
reports were tailored to the needs of
each class.
The purpose of this paper is to present
the findings of a research project aimed

at determining the similarities and
differences in the disclosure preferences
of analysts and shareholders. In effect,
the objective of the research was to
evaluate the advisability of preparing
separate accounting reports for each
user group under the policy of differen
tial disclosure.

Research Design and Methodology
In order to test the validity of the con
cept of differential disclosure, a
questionnaire approach was utilized.
The names of 298 of the approximate
ly 5,000 members of the Financial
Analysts Federation were selected from
the organization’s Membership Direc
tory, using a random numbers table.
Members eligible for selection included
industry specialists in 38 fields and per
sons designated as “director of research”
or “generalist.” Excluded from the pop
ulation sampled were specialists in
foreign securities, special situations,
bonds and venture capital, as well as
members who were economists,
technicians, underwriters, investment
counselors, portfolio managers, or who
resided outside the United States.
The common stockholders of one
large U.S. corporation whose stock is
traded on the New York Stock Ex
change were also chosen to participate
in the study. The subject corporation is
engaged in the mining and refinement of
minerals and the sale of . mineral
products; over 12,000,000 shares of
common stock are outstanding. Exlud
ed from the population sampled were
officers, employees, and directors of the
corporation; institutional investors
(whose characteristics would, it was
thought, approximate those of the
analyst group); brokerage houses hold
ing stock in street name; and persons
located outside the United States. In
total, 753 stockholders were selected for
polling on a random basis.
Similar questionnaires were designed
for administration to both the analysts
and the stockholders. Twenty-five
specific disclosures recently proposed or
adopted by the SEC for the 10-K report
and/or the annual stockholder report
were listed in random order in the
questionnaires. Only those disclosures
which are general in nature, applicable
to a wide variety of industries, appeared
on the list.
Analysts were requested to indicate,
for each disclosure, the usefulness in
deciding whether or not to buy or
recommend a company’s stock. Similar
ly, stockholders were asked how useful
each disclosure would be in deciding
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Analysts appear to be more
concerned with quantitative
disclosures: stockholders seem
more interested in the
company's image and the
competence of management.

whether or not to buy or sell a com
pany’s stock. In both cases, research
participants were to indicate their
responses by circling a number on a fivepoint scale on which zero represented
“not useful” and four represented “very
useful.”8
A “dummy” disclosure item, not ac
tually proposed by the SEC, was includ
ed among the legitimate disclosures in
order to provide a rough gauge of the
reliability of the research instrument.
The text of the “dummy” item was: “A
listing of the names of all common
stockholders who own fewer than 100
shares of the company’s stock at the end
of the year.” It was thought that this dis
closure would not be useful to the in
vestment decisions of reasonable users.
The research was conducted in three
stages. Questionnaires were pretested by
administration to several relevant per
sons, followed by discussion with them
of the adequacy of the instruments. A
pilot test was conducted through which
the reliability and face validity of the
questionnaires were determined to be
sufficiently high, and the disclosure
items were found to be worded suf
ficiently clearly that the same in
struments could be used for the primary
study. A test for nonresponse bias was
conducted and it was determined by
application of the t-test that secondrequest responses did not differ
significantly from those received in the
initial survey. Usable responses were
received from 127 analysts and 275
stockholders, representing 42.6 and 36.5
percent, respectively, of the question
naires mailed.
Research Results
The data which emerged from the
questionnaire study indicate that signifi
cant differences (at the .05 percent level)
in the perceived usefulness favoring one
group or the other occurred for thirteen
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titative in nature, i.e., they emphasize
the integrity, quality and reputation of
management and its activities rather
than adjustments to the financial
statements. Items 10 and 11 do include
dollar figures, but the thrust of the dis
closures seems to lie with the activities
themselves rather than the amounts of
money involved.
In summary, the results suggest that
analysts as a group are more concerned
than stockholders with analyzing
current reported earnings and with es
timating future earnings. In contrast,
stockholders appear more interested
than analysts in the basic competence of
management and in the company’s im
Item9
Description
1
Book value of obsolete
age. The implication may be that either
equipment
(1) stockholders are more prone than
analysts to make their investment
2
Investment in loss division
3
Capital expenditure analysis decisions based on the quality of
management and its activities, perhaps
4
Available lines of credit
because, as a class, they possess a lower
5
Short-term borrowing cost
degree of financial sophistication to
6
CPA-auditor change
7
Assets carried at less
make adequate quantitative analyses
than market
from a company’s financial statements;
or (2) stockholders rely primarily on
8
Accounting alternatives
effect on income
analysts and brokers for their invest
9
Tax rate difference
ment decisions, and their interest in the
explanation
qualitative aspects of corporations
merely acts as a constraint on the advice
Disclosure items more useful to the offered by others.
stockholder respondents were:
Another observation evident from the
Item
Description
data is that analysts rated the disclosure
10
Political fund contributions
items on a wider range of the scale than
11
Attorney and CPA lawsuits did stockholders. The median
12
New issuers: Offering price
usefulness ratings of the analysts
of shares
respondents ranged from .44 to 3.69;
13
Management effectiveness
four medians fell below 2.00, the mid
audit
point in the scale. The stockholder
medians varied from 1.79 to 3.56, and
These results suggest that, where only one received a median below 2.00.
significant differences exist between the
The results suggest that analysts, as a
two groups, analysts may find dis class, are more discriminating than
closures that are quantitative in nature stockholders in their ability to pick out
more useful than do stockholders. With from the list those disclosures which
the exception of disclosure of CPA- they view as irrelevant. Stockholders
auditor change information (Item 6), appear to advocate “disclosure for the
the disclosures more useful to the sake of disclosure,” perhaps because of
analysts sampled dealt with dollars and their belief that they have a right to
percents. Indeed a majority of them know a great deal about the companies
(Items 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9) are aimed at in which they own an interest. All the
adjusting the traditional financial disclosures are viewed as at least
statements in order to estimate a com moderately useful by the shareholders.
pany’s value or recent progress, or to This conclusion appears to be further
make the statements comparable to substantiated by the fact that the stock
those of other companies. Items, 3, 4, holder sample found disclosure of the
and 5 may be useful in estimating a names of all shareholders who own
company’s future earnings.
fewer than one hundred shares of a com
pany’s stock (the trivial “dummy” item,
On the other hand, three of the four not actually proposed by the SEC)
disclosures viewed more useful by the somewhat more useful than the analysts
stockholders polled (Items 10, 11, and polled.
13) are qualitative rather than quan
In order to gauge the degree of con-

of the twenty-five legitimate disclosures.
The results of the chi-square test applied
to the results show that in nine in
stances, significantly more analysts and
fewer stockholders found the disclosure
items useful than expected, and in four
cases, more stockholders and fewer
analysts found the items useful than ex
pected. For the remaining twelve dis
closures, the results were mixed, i.e.,
they did not clearly favor one group
over the other.
The disclosure items perceived as
significantly more useful to the analyst
respondents were-

sensus within each of the two groups,
the mean absolute deviations relative to
the usefulness medians were calculated.
The deviations for analysts ranged from
.60 to 1.18, whereas deviations for the
stockholders were much greater and
ranged from .94 to 1.42. These results
suggest that, while the degree of consen
sus for analysts is not great, the group is
considerably more unified than the
stockholder class. Analysts have a more
common
background
than
stockholders: they are all members of a
professional organization; most of them
engage in financial analysis as an oc
cupation; and they are rather
sophisticated in their knowledge of
accounting terms and principles.
Stockholders, on the other hand,
probably vary considerably in their
educational backgrounds, in the extent
to which they do their own financial
analysis, in their knowledge of business
and accounting, and in their
professional stature.

Summary of Research Findings
The results suggest that the two user
groups may be differentiated along
several lines. Analysts appear to be
more concerned than stockholders with
using quantitative disclosures aimed at
analyzing current reported earnings and
estimating future earnings.
Stockholders, on the other hand, seem
to be more interested in qualitative dis
closures dealing with the company’s
image and the competence of
management.
Analysts seem to be better able than
stockholders to distinguish the irrele
vant information from a rather exten
sive list of disclosures. Stockholders ap
parently desire convenient access to
large quantities of information, suggest
ing “disclosure for the sake of dis
closure” as a matter of principle.
Analysts as a group appear to be more
homogeneous than stockholders. The
degree of consensus among financial
analysts concerning the usefulness of
corporate disclosures seems to be
significantly greater than for
stockholders.
Conclusion
The limited scope of the research pro
ject does not warrant sweeping
generalizations. However, the survey
results suggest that the SEC’s existing
differential disclosure policy of requir
ing extensive corporate disclosure in the
10-K report, but a more limited degree
of revelation in the annual stockholder
report, is sound. Although stockholders
indicate that they are moderately in

terested in all the SEC’s disclosures, the
research results seem to show that the
interest on the part of the analysts is
significantly greater for disclosures of
the quantitative variety. Analysts, then,
who appear more concerned than
stockholders with disclosures such as
the analysis of capital expenditures and
the explanation of tax rate differences,
should have available to them this type
of information in the 10-K. Since
analysts probably already have greater
access to the 10-K report than do
stockholders, it follows that the dis
closures analysts perceive as significant
ly more useful could be revealed via that
source.
Qualitative disclosures, such as infor
mation concerning attorney and CPA
lawsuits and political fund con
tributions, on the other hand, seem to
have greater appeal to the stockholder
group, and perhaps should be required
for the corporate annual shareholder
report. Such reports are made widely
available to current and prospective in
vestors, by brokerages houses as well as
by the issuing corporations, and would
seem to be a suitable medium for dis
closures of the qualitative type.
However, stockholders as a class ap
parently are not homogeneous. For
tunately, the individual stockholders
who desire a more complete revelation
of data concerning companies in which
they own an interest, including dis
closures of a quantitative nature, do
have access to the 10-K report. The SEC

requires companies over which it has
jurisdiction to furnish to stockholders,
on request and without charge, a copy of
its most recent 10-K report.
Therefore, by catering to the average
stockholder through the annual
stockholder report, yet providing the
financial analyst and the sophisticated
stockholder convenient access to 10-K
data as well, the SEC’s current policy of
differential diclosure seems optimal.
However, as reported earlier in this
paper, the SEC intends to propose
regulations which would develop a
single, comprehensive disclosure policy
combining the annual report to
stockholders and the 10-K report. By
abandoning its differential disclosure
policy, the SEC appears to do a dis
service to its registrant corporations, to
their stockholders, and to financial
analysts. Stockholder reports would
presumably contain considerably more
financial information under the new
policy. Such reports, which will not con
tain data that the analyst could not
currently obtain via the 10-K report, will
become more expensive to prepare and
mail. In addition, the “average in
vestor,” when presented with the greater
quantities of data, may find it in
creasingly difficult to isolate those areas
which are most relevant to the decision
processes. Both the stockholder and the
analyst may be inhibited from making
optimal decisions because of informa
tion overload.
In sum, the research results seem to
support the validity of the concept of
differential disclosure. The SEC’s plan
to combine the stockholder reports and
statutory filings appears to be a step
backward when the viewpoints of
stockholders, analysts and the issuing
corporations are considered.■
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